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The experimenter expectancy effect: an inevitable component of school science? 
 
ABSTRACT: A medium-scale quantitative study (n=99) found that 10-11 year-old pupils 
dealt with theory and evidence in notably different ways, depending on how the same science 
practical task was delivered. Under the auspices of a part-randomised and part-quasi 
experimental design, pupils were asked to complete a brief, apparently simple task involving 
scientific measurement. One half of the sample carried out the task in a naturalistic whole 
class context; the other half worked as lone experimenters in solitary conditions where 
accuracy of measurement was promoted. In the whole class setting pupils exposed to an 
illustrative lesson displayed behaviour indicative of experimenter expectancy, tending to 
differentiate theory and evidence to a lesser degree than pupils who experienced an enquiry 
lesson. In addition, during the illustrative lesson many of the pupils were biased towards their 
theories in ways that lay well beyond those intended by the research design. In the solitary 
setting pupils performed equally well with both illustrative and enquiry treatments. 
Implications are discussed in the light of the problems of excessive pupil theory/data-
ladeness. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of exposing young learners to more 
authentic versions of professional science are considered.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The process of scientific thinking involves the interplay of two elements that have been historically 
regarded as separate entities – theory and evidence (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000). The modern view holds 
that both are vital, helping to give science a robustness that is lacking in other ways of thinking, such 
as reflected in religious assertions where empirical evidence is deemed unnecessary. ‘Theory’ 
represents the product of internal human mental activities; ‘evidence’ relates to events taking place in 
the outside sphere that can be sampled via human perception. Descartes famously characterised this 
duality, emphasising the disconnectedness of the two entities (Alsop, 2005).  
Although debate continues about what precisely constitutes the scientific method (Lawson, 
2010), all varieties of modern science are informed by a post-positivist philosophy that assumes an 
evidence-based position. But throughout science’s evolution physical evidence has been given varying 
degrees of importance. The medieval scholar Thomas Aquinas held that since science facts and laws 
were part of a Nature created by God, once discovered they can never be challenged by new evidence 
(Chesterton, 1933); he was excessively theory-led. Later, in the 17
th
 century Francis Bacon recognised 
that much of medieval science was static, with laws being written in stone, and preconceived notions 
led to biased conclusions. He advocated instead an inductive method which required an objective 
approach: expectations regarding the outcome of an experiment were forbidden, with theories being 
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derived directly from observations of physical phenomena (Priest, 2007). To Bacon, prior knowledge 
was not considered relevant and evidence was sacrosanct – he was excessively data-led. Directed by 
thinkers such as Newton and Galileo this developed into the contemporary view of a hypothetico-
deductive scientific method, where hypotheses are formulated from a theory then tested during 
experimentation, either being accepted or rejected as a consequence (Poletiek, 2001). These later 
scientists were neither excessively theory nor data-led.  
For science to work both theory and evidence need to be in agreement - if they diverge, then 
one of them is incorrect and must be discarded. As stated, a theory can be rejected when using a 
hypothetico-deductive method as a result of convincing experimental evidence that refutes that theory, 
and an alternative then proposed. On the other hand, when theory and evidence do not correspond it is 
sometimes due to poor methodology yielding invalid data, or unknown confounding variables, and 
once this is recognised then the evidence is rejected and the theory remains viable. Havdala and 
Ashkenazi (2007) call this the informed view.  
 As happened with Aquinas and Bacon, modern scientists aligned with a hypothetico-deductive 
approach have in a similar way sometimes given inappropriate weighting to either theory or evidence 
(Dunbar, 2000; Greenwald, Pratkanis, Lieppe & Baumgardner, 1986). If a theory is strongly believed 
prior to experimentation, then confirmation bias can ensue where evidence that refutes that theory is 
sidelined, and only data that support the theory are recorded, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophesy 
where the theory survives. This is taking an overly theory-laden approach. Conversely, excess import 
can be laid upon experimental evidence, with scientists having an overly data-laden mind set. British 
Empiricists such as Bacon awarded undue importance to their data which they viewed as being 
objectively pure and so irrefutable (Priest, 2007), mechanically disproving any opposing theory 
without giving thought to experimental error or unconscious human biases.   
Much of school science involves illustrative, or verification practical work where the class 
firstly learns the scientific concepts behind an experiment then carries out a laboratory activity in order 
to demonstrate that principle in action (Nott & Smith, 1995; Rogan & Aldous, 2005). During these 
lessons pupils are generally aware of what the outcome of the activity will be, because it is based on 
known theory, their task being simply to confirm that theory. If they fail to do this then their data must 
be wrong, and teachers usually cite learners’ experimental failure as the reason. By design these 
activities only serve to blur the boundary between theory and evidence in pupils’ minds, but are 
thought to be necessary in order that correct science is learned (Nott & Smith, 1995). Conversely, with 
more open-ended, enquiry activities typically pupils are unaware of the outcome. They make 
predictions or hypotheses then test them experimentally, as would a professional scientist, and the 
usefulness of these more authentic portrayals of science in the classroom have been lauded (e.g. 
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Blanchard, Southerland, Osborne, Sampson, Annetta & Granger, 2010; Dean & Kuhn, 2007; 
Fairbrother & Hackling, 1997; Marx, Blumenfeld, Krajcik, Fishman, Soloway, Geier et al., 2004).  
As will be appreciated from the preceding discussion there are differences between the ways 
professional scientists and school pupils conduct their science, although both groups follow procedural 
rules that require any conclusions to be evidence-based. This assumption still holds during illustrative 
lessons in school where the purpose is to confirm a known theory. However, pupils have demonstrated 
similarly errant attitudes to their professional counterparts towards theories and the evidence they 
collect during class experiments. Even during enquiry experiments, when faced with a theory/evidence 
disparity they tend to assume an overly theory-laden mind set and automatically reject their empirical 
results out of hand (e.g. author, 2010; Austin, Holding, Bell & Daniels, 1991; Gunstone & 
Champagne, 1990; Lubben & Millar, 1996; Zimmerman, Raghavan & Sartoris, 2003). Pupils may 
have difficulties switching between the positivistic epistemology of the more common illustrative 
practicals and the constructivist epistemology of the usually rarer hypothetico-deductive open ended 
enquiry tasks (author, 2011). This might create a tendency amongst pupils towards being positivistic 
and overly theory-laden in all of their scientific enterprises, even during enquiry activities when there 
is no authoritative theory to confirm. An extreme position involves young experimenters believing that 
the evidence they have been instructed to collect is merely another version of the theory under 
investigation (Foulds, Gott & Feasey, 1992; Havdala & Ashkenazi, 2007; Kuhn, Amsel & 
O'Loughlan, 1988; Zimmerman, 2007). These pupils assume it is their role to actively seek out results 
that confirm a single, predetermined outcome, and if they collect results that refute that outcome, they 
have failed the task. They have not properly differentiated theory and evidence; instead, they believe 
that they represent the same entity.  
Dialogue between peers is generally considered to be fruitful in science lessons, particularly 
during experimentation where pupils typically work in small groups (e.g. Mercer, Dawes & Staarman, 
2009). However, within the literature there is some support to the view that the influence of peers can 
exacerbate theory/evidence non-differentiation, making theory-led behaviours more or less inevitable.  
 
“In many carefully organised experiments the discovery is made by the quickest member of the class, often the noisiest, 
who then provides the rest with the answer” (Wellington, 1981, p168). 
 
These social factors, much studied in the psychology genre, can manifest as a band wagon 
effect especially when data are ambiguous (e.g. Asch, 1951; Baron, Vandello & Brunsman, 1996; 
Stangor, 2004; Wood, 2000). Pupils sometimes have so little regard for the empirical evidence they 
have personally collected during a science lesson that they habitually copy the results of collaborators 
in the class, if they think that they have the ‘right answers’ (Atkinson, 1990; Del Carlo & Bodner, 
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2004; Rigano & Richie, 1995). Alternatively, peers can compete with each other in a chase for the 
right answer which triggers theory-led behaviours such as inventing results that correspond with their 
theory, or manipulating apparatus to give the desired outcome (author, 2011). 
 
Theoretical background 
Rosenthal performed a series of classic psychology experiments in the 1960s that investigated how the 
prior expectations of experimenters influenced their subsequent actions during data collection and 
inference making (Rosenthal, 1966). For one study, he accrued two groups of adult volunteers and 
asked them to perform an experiment that involved timing lab rats as they negotiated a maze. One 
group was told to expect that their rats were able to learn a maze quickly (maze-bright rats), and the 
other group were told theirs would not learn the maze easily (maze-dull rats). Consequently, the maze-
bright group of participants recorded significantly faster times for their rats than the maze-dull group 
(mean p < 0.01). However, the rats used for both groups belonged to the same population and so there 
should have been no differences.  
 Rosenthal’s work demonstrated the powerful influence of scientific expectations that have been 
inadequately bracketed during data collection; he called this the experimenter expectancy effect.
i
 
Rosenthal concluded that the effects in his study were unintentional and experimenters were 
unconsciously handling the rats so to increase their speed around the maze.  Participants had been 
overly theory-laden and had without realising it failed to differentiate adequately between theory and 
evidence, even though they themselves might have thought they were experimenting fairly. Other than 
the field of animal behaviour, the experimenter expectancy effect has also been demonstrated in other 
settings, including the legal (e.g. Martindale, 2005) and the medical professions (e.g. Wigal et al., 
1997) as well as in more everyday contexts (e.g. Gilovich, 1991).  
 The science education literature contains some references to how experimenters can be biased 
by their own expectations, though this has always been a neglected area of research (e.g. author, 2007; 
Chinn & Brewer; 1998; Hainsworth, 1956 & 1958; McCormas & Moore, 2001; Rigano & Richie, 
1995; Watson, Swain & McRobbie; 2004; Zimmerman et al., 2003). The authors of one study of 
experimenter expectancy in school biology pupils (aged 14-19) describe the effect potentially being a 
universal problem that can apply to almost any kind of scientific measurement in the classroom 
(McCormas & Moore, 2001). The current study replicates the principle behind Rosenthal’s rat 
research, with two groups of school pupils being allowed to have different expectations of events that 
should in fact yield similar results, in an attempt to investigate what happens if theory and evidence 
fail to correlate. The findings will be discussed with reference to the theory and data-ladeness of 
participants. In this respect, the study represents work that is original to science education.  
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There has been recent debate in the literature regarding the efficacy or otherwise of enquiry 
lessons over more didactic forms of teaching science. Blanchard et al. (2010), reviewing a wide range 
of previous research concluded that any reported advantages of an enquiry approach have been at best 
mixed, or inconclusive. Interestingly, this equivocal research base is juxtaposed alongside the major 
emphasis, involving huge resources of manpower and funding, placed on enquiry-based science over 
the past 20 years within school curricula in the UK, US, Australia, and elsewhere. The current study 
did not examine any pedagogical superiority/inferiority of enquiry lessons over illustrative lessons 
with respect to substantive learning, as it did not attempt to measure pupils’ constructions of science 
concepts. Instead, the focus was on pupils’ procedural behaviour, specifically their treatment of theory 
and evidence, and as such intends to contribute to the continuing debate over the worth of enquiry in 
school science. 
 
 
Methodology  
 
Preamble 
The problems associated with pupils’ failure to differentiate theory and evidence act as a barrier to 
learning science, particularly the proper procedural rules of experimentation. The current research 
aimed to compare pupils’ behaviours during different types of practical work in order to study how 
well they were able to differentiate between theory and evidence. This was operationalised in the form 
of two randomised educational experiments, where the effects of two different treatments were 
compared within the bounds of each experiment.  
In the first experiment pupils experienced either one of two treatments when being taught as a 
whole class. The first treatment was illustrative in type where pupils were asked to undertake a 
practical task, but were told one of the outcomes at the outset (theory-led group). The second treatment 
took the form of an enquiry exercise where pupils carried out the same practical activity as used with 
the first treatment, though were not told any outcome (hypothetico-deductive group).  
The second experiment involved pupils collecting their data in a side room away from the rest 
of the class, acting as solo experimenters. As with the first experiment, the first treatment was 
illustrative (theory-led group) and the second treatment was enquiry in type (hypothetico-deductive 
group). When compared with the first experiment, the conditions of the second experiment more 
resembled how professional scientists might collect their data. 
 
Research questions 
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1. Do pupils treat theory and evidence differently when undertaking an illustrative science 
activity, compared with an enquiry science activity? 
2. Do pupils treat theory and evidence differently when in a whole class context, compared with 
when they work independently away from their peers? 
 
 
 
Participants and sampling 
The study was carried out in a mixed gender, non-selective state maintained middle school in the 
southeast of England. The samples were accrued from year 6 pupils (ages 10-11 years). As shown in 
figure 1, there were two distinct phases of the research: the whole class phase (49 pupils), and the lone 
experimenter phase (50 pupils). Within each phase pupils were randomly divided into groups, the 
theory-led group (T-L), and the hypothetico-deductive group (H-D). In the lone experimenter phase a 
random error group (R-E) was also formed via the randomisation process. Randomisation was 
achieved with respect to pupil ability, measured using non-verbal reasoning tests (NFER-Nelson, with 
standardised scores). The two phases took place in the same school and used pupils of the same age, 
but drew their respective samples from different cohorts of pupils. As such, any comparisons between 
phases are quasi-experimental in type, and so associations must be made more tentatively than those 
within phases, which accrued randomised samples (see figure 1). After sampling was complete there 
were found to be no significant ability or gender differences between any of the samples or sub-
samples in the study.  
 
Method 
 
a) Whole class phase 
Both groups carried out the experiment on the same day over two successive lessons and did not meet 
between the lessons, so preventing inter-group contamination. The researcher acted as the teacher in 
both sessions, and each lesson took around 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Theory-led group. Pupils were asked to carry out a simple exercise that involved measuring and 
recording the temperatures of three different plastic cups of water using a glass thermometer that had 
an analogue scale. The cups themselves were identical physically and contained the same volume of 
water (one third full). Each of the three cups was lagged with a different material, namely fur, felt, or 
aluminium cooking foil, and had no lids. The water had been left to equilibrate overnight in the room 
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and so was at ambient temperature during the study.
ii
 The cups were explicitly labelled in a large font 
with the name of the lagged material.  
The lesson began with pupils pairing up then completing a short worksheet question that 
required them to make predictions, with free discussion being encouraged amongst the class (figure 2). 
The item was presented in the form of a bluff question that erroneously implied materials at ambient 
temperature would actively warm a cup of ‘cold’ water.iii In order to inform their judgements during 
the prediction phase, pupils had a chance to handle examples of the materials, not attached to any of 
the cups. In an attempt to generate experimenter expectancy, after making predictions the class were 
erroneously informed by the teacher that out of the three choices, fur was actually the best material to 
actively heat water, and this was the reason why animals in a cold climate had thick fur. Pupils who 
had made the ‘correct’ prediction were praised, and to further enhance any confirmation bias pupils 
were (again erroneously) advised that the water had been in the cups for long enough to allow it to get 
warm. 
Keeping in pairs, pupils then commenced with the practical task. Each pair had the three cups 
in front of them and had to use a single thermometer to measure the temperature of each. No further 
advice was given with regards to carrying out the activity. All results were recorded on the worksheet 
(figure 2), that had the prediction clear in view on the same page. After collecting the three results, 
pupils were asked to summarise their findings on the same worksheet under ‘conclusions’ by ranking 
the three materials in order of effectiveness at heating ‘cold’ water (1st, 2nd, 3rd). However, 
immediately before making their conclusions they were asked to write fur at the top of the conclusion 
list, because that should be the best material at warming the water. Thus, the T-L lesson was semi-
illustrative since pupils were given one outcome (fur) and had to determine two unknown outcomes 
(felt and foil) by experimentation. 
 
Hypothetico-deductive group. After making predictions in an identical manner to the theory-led group, 
pupils were then asked to measure the three cup temperatures. Unlike with the theory-led pupils, there 
was no prior discussion of prediction choices by the teacher; particularly, no ‘right answer’ was 
publicly or privately told to pupils. As with the theory-led group, pupils were informed, to help 
develop confirmation bias, that the water had been in the cups for long enough to become warm. 
Pupils then carried out the experiment in exactly the same manner as the theory-led group; this 
included the writing of results and conclusions, but pupils were given free choice when ranking their 
conclusions. 
 The H-D lesson was not ‘true’ open-ended enquiry, since unknown outcomes had to be 
determined in a context controlled by the teacher. Havdala & Ashkenazi (2007) describe a typology of 
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enquiry where the higher the level the more pupil autonomy is allowed. The H-D lesson in the current 
research was at level 1 (structured enquiry); true open-ended enquiry tasks lie at level 3. 
 
b) Lone experimenter phase 
The lone experimenter phase was carried out in order to examine pupils’ behaviours away from any 
peer influence. Pupils carried out the same practical task as was done during the whole class phase in 
conditions that more resembled how professional scientists might work. Although scientists operate in 
collaborative teams, they tend to collect their data alone, making careful measurements and 
observations free from distractions. This is contrary to school science activities, where pupils tend to 
work together in groups – data collection is a team effort, often taking place in a noisy, lively 
environment filled with peer interaction.  
Prior to the experiment, pupils underwent the same process as the whole class phase sample, 
making predictions together with the rest of their group. They were not told any ‘right answer’ at this 
stage. One by one, pupils were led into a side room where the experiment was to take place. The 
apparatus was placed in a well-lit quiet corner of the room away from the researcher’s gaze so to 
create an atmosphere of privacy for experimenters. Unlike with the whole class phase where pupils 
were issued a single thermometer, to aid accuracy of measurement one thermometer per cup was 
utilised instead. Accuracy was further promoted by pupils being allowed a brief practice before the 
actual data collection stage, being shown three flashcards of thermometers at different temperatures. 
Immediately after each pupil had left, the thermometers were checked to ensure the temperatures had 
not inadvertently risen due to handling, and none had. The movement of pupils was organised to avoid 
contamination between those who had completed the experiment and those who had not.  
 
Theory-led group. Each pupil entered the side room alone and their prediction sheet was examined by 
the teacher. To generate experimenter expectancy, the researcher informed the pupil that the material 
they had chosen as being most likely to warm the water was actually correct, was praised, and a brief 
reason was offered, i.e. this is why foil is used in cooking/polar bears have thick fur/felt is used for 
slippers. Pupils were then led over to the apparatus and asked to make observations and record the 
three cup temperatures on their worksheet; the researcher walked away from the apparatus and left 
them alone to work. Pupils were not asked to write conclusions as this would had involved writing a 
rank order of heating effectiveness (in the absence of peers), and since they would have done this 
immediately after writing the temperatures down, it was thought likely they would simply restate their 
results. 
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Hypothetico-deductive group. The procedure was identical to that utilised with the theory-led pupils, 
except that no ‘right answer’ was suggested during discussion of the prediction choice.  
 
c) Random error group 
In order to study how accurate pupils could be in using thermometers to measure the temperature of 
water in the absence of any biasing preconception effects, nine pupils were randomly selected during 
the sampling process of the lone experimenter phase. Similarly, pupils were led one-by-one into a side 
room then asked to write down the temperatures of ‘cold’ water in three bare cups without insulating 
material. Pupils were informed that their skill at reading a thermometer was being assessed. 
 
(INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2). 
 
 
Results 
 
See tables 1-6. (‘U/C’ represents written entries that were uncodable, which was nearly always 
because the pupil had not written down any value on the worksheet). 
 
(INSERT TABLES 1-6) 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The following is a summary of analyses that were applied to the data. The statistical methods utilised 
were Student’s t test, ANOVA, and the chi square test for independent groups; the confidence limits 
for statistical significance were set at 95%. Note that there were no significant links between either 
pupil ability or gender with any of the variables discussed hereon in. 
 
a) Whole class phase 
Predictions. In both the theory-led (T-L) and hypothetico-deductive (H-D) lessons, pupils’ predictions 
were heavily weighted towards fur as being solely the best material for heating cold water (T-L = 
19/22 pupils; H-D = 18/24).
iv
 In both groups, fur was chosen more often in preference to foil and felt 
(T-L p < 0.0001; H-D p < 0.001). 
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Results. More pupils in the T-L group recorded fur as being the sole warmest material (T-L 9/20; H-D 
4/26 group); this difference between the groups is not statistically significant (p = 0.06). However, 
within the T-L group fur was observed as being the sole warmest more frequently than foil or felt (p < 
0.05), while with the H-D group each material was observed at an equivalent frequency. The mean 
temperatures that pupils recorded were T-L = 19.1ºC, and H-D = 18.5ºC, which is a significant 
difference (p < 0.01).  
 
Conclusions. More T-L than H-D pupils (p < 0.01) chose fur as being the sole warmest (T-L 12/17; H-
D 4/20 H-D). As with the results phase, the T-L group had chosen fur as the sole warmest more often 
than the other materials (p < 0.0001), though with the H-D group there were no differences. 
 
Matching predictions with results. There were 8/19 T-L pupils whose prediction ranking matched 
perfectly with their results compared with 0/26 of H-D pupils (p < 0.01).  
 
Matching predictions with conclusions. 5/16 T-L pupils perfectly matched their prediction ranking 
with their conclusions compared with 1/20 of H-D pupils, which is not significantly different. 
 
Matching results with conclusions. 5/14 T-L pupils recorded conclusions that did not reflect their 
written results; 1/23 in the H-D group did likewise (p < 0.05). 
 
Prediction–results–conclusions match. In the T-L group 3 pupils had both observed and concluded 
precisely what they had predicted; no-one in the H-D group fell into this category (difference not 
significant). 
 
b) Lone experimenter phase 
Predictions. Although metal foil was the commonest material predicted to be the warmest in both 
groups (T-L = 10/21; H-D = 10/20), statistically, it was not chosen significantly more than fur or felt.  
 
Results. No one material was recorded as being solely the warmest significantly more often than the 
other two in either the T-L or H-D group - each material was observed at an equivalent frequency. The 
mean temperatures that pupils recorded were T-L = 23.4ºC, and H-D = 23.3ºC, which is not a 
significant difference. 
 
Matching predictions with results. In the T-L group, 1/21 had their observations perfectly match their 
predictions; in the H-D group, it was 3/20. This difference is not significant. 
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c) Random error group 
The mean temperature that random error pupils recorded was 22.9ºC (n=9); this value was 
significantly lower than the mean temperatures obtained in the lone experimenter phase by both the T-
L group (23.4ºC, p < 0.05) and the H-D group (23.3ºC, p < 0.05). The mean real temperature for the 
three cups, as measured by the teacher was 22.9ºC. 
 
Temperature ranges 
The temperature range for each pupil was their highest recorded temperature minus their lowest 
recorded temperature and was considered a measure of how accurate the pupil had been when reading 
the thermometer (table 6). There were no differences between the T-L and H-D groups in the whole 
class phase; the same held for the lone experimenter phase. When the T-L and H-D groups from each 
phase were combined, so comparing whether one phase comprised of pupils who were more accurate, 
there were no differences. The random error pupils had significantly lesser temperature ranges than 
those of the whole class combined T-L/H-D groups (p < 0.01) and also the lone experimenter 
combined T-L/H-D groups (p < 0.05). 
 
 
Discussion
v
 
 
The study aimed to compare how well pupils would differentiate between theory and evidence under 
different experimental conditions. Each pupil’s theory was an internal construct that represented an 
external scientific phenomenon, i.e. their current ‘best guess’ of reality, and was sampled a maximum 
of twice during the lessons, as their written prediction and conclusion. Their evidence was the 
temperatures they had recorded (tables 1-4).  
 
a) Whole class phase 
Pupils from both T-L and H-D groups predicted fur as being the most likely to heat the ‘cold’ water 
the most (86% and 75% respectively, see table 5). Note that prediction-making took place before 
pupils in the T-L group were erroneously told that fur was the ‘right answer’. None of the pupils made 
the scientifically correct prediction, that all materials would have an equal (zero) effect on changing 
the temperature of the water.  
 When it came to data collection, although both the T-L and H-D pupils were observing the 
same type of scientific phenomena the two groups recorded markedly different results. Although 
around 50% of pupils in both groups produced results that indicated one of the materials appeared to 
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be having a superior heating effect when compared with the others, the T-L group tended to record fur 
as being the most effective (43%). Three of the T-L group had recorded results for foil and felt but had 
left fur blank. This could be due to having been told by the teacher that fur should be the best heating 
material, and they considered this to be a foregone conclusion, seeing no need to write a result for fur; 
none of the H-D group had blank results. With the H-D group, all three materials were reported as the 
warmest with equivalent frequency. Since the sole independent variable between the two groups was 
that the T-L pupils had been told to expect a specific occurrence, that fur would have a better warming 
effect than foil or felt, these data suggest that Rosenthal’s experimenter expectancy effect was 
generated within some of the T-L pupils.  
That pupils were influenced by the teacher’s explicit stating of a ‘textbook’ answer is perhaps 
unsurprising, since this approach would be familiar to them as it is the mainstay of illustrative practical 
work in school science where the aim is the confirmation of a known outcome. That said, there are 
problems with theory-led experimentation, discussed previously, and also later in Implications. 
However, the T-L pupils in the current study did not only appear to be influenced by teacher-led 
expectations. On top of this, it also seems that they allowed their own personal expectations to cloud 
their data collection. Forty per cent of the T-L group (8 pupils) not only recorded fur as being the 
warmest material (as they had predicted, and had been confirmed as ‘correct’ by the teacher), they also 
perfectly matched all three of their predictions with their three results (e.g. pupil # 1 from Table 1). 
No-one in the H-D group had done this.  
Members of the T-L group were primed by the teacher to expect one result to be the ‘right 
answer’ - that fur would come out at the top of the hierarchy. It might be the case that this priming 
created a general mind-set for confirmation bias to thrive, and even proliferate, which culminated in 
not only the fur result being unfairly arrived at in order to get the ‘right answer’, but also other 
predictions that had not been verified by the teacher as being correct. These pupils were not only 
generating the outcome that they knew they had to get right, they also did the same with the outcomes 
that they did not have to get right. These T-L pupils had been more influenced by their theory - what 
they imagined all the outcomes would be, instead of their evidence - what the outcomes actually were. 
In a procedural sense, they had been poor scientists. They failed to differentiate between internal 
theory and external evidence, seeing them both as equivalent entities, with the purpose of the exercise 
being to produce evidence so that the two corresponded.  
 When it came to making conclusions, pupils were asked to place the three materials in rank 
order of effectiveness at heating ‘cold’ water. Fur was reported as being solely the most effective by 
71% of T-L pupils, while no-one chose foil or felt (table 5). The H-D pupils reported the three 
materials with equivalent frequency. Again, this is perhaps not surprising since the teacher had 
reminded the T-L pupils just before they made conclusions that fur was the more efficacious material, 
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although this too demonstrates the experimenter expectancy effect being triggered in response to an 
overly theory-led approach. When concluding, procedurally, pupils are expected to write statements 
that fairly reflect the empirical data they have collected. However, a number of them had results and 
conclusions that did not match, with more of the T-L pupils failing to match (33%, 5 pupils, e.g. pupil 
# 4), compared with the H-D group (4%, 1 pupil, # 28). Four of the five T-L pupils who had done this 
opted for the fur-foil-felt hierarchy when writing conclusions, which was the most favoured hierarchy 
chosen by the T-L class as a whole during the conclusion phase (7/16, 44%). None of these five T-L 
pupils had recorded fur as being the sole warmest material in their results. It is possible that these 
pupils were influenced by a general consensus into generating a conclusion that did not fairly reflect 
their empirical data, because others in the class believed that this hierarchy was the ‘right answer’. The 
bandwagon effect has been noted previously during school science practical work both during data 
collection and (especially) when making an inference such as an experimental conclusion (e.g. 
Atkinson, 1990; author, 2011; Rigano & Richie, 1995).  
An alternate interpretation is that since none of the five pupils had results that showed fur as 
being the sole warmest material, they were influenced only by the ‘textbook’ answer as pronounced by 
the teacher, since four of them ended up concluding this specific outcome. It might have been a 
combination effect of both social and ‘textbook’ pressures. A further possibility involves random 
carelessness as being the cause for writing mismatched results and conclusions, although this is 
thought to be unlikely since mismatching hardly occurred in the H-D group (1 pupil, 4%), suggesting 
that some factor embedded within the T-L lesson was to blame. The current study provided no data 
with which to confirm or refute these speculations. However, despite the lack of evidence relating to 
the reasons that lay behind pupils’ behaviours, it is proposed that since none of these five pupils were 
the same as the eight T-L pupils who had previously matched their predictions precisely with results, it 
appears experimenter expectancy most likely had had a major influence on 13/23 pupils during the T-
L lesson. The effect looks to have had a lesser though still notable influence on others in the T-L group 
who had recorded or concluded fur as being the ‘right answer’; for instance 100% of the group wrote 
fur as being the warmest material in their conclusions (71% as the sole warmest material, 29% as 
equal warmest).   
 
b) Lone experimenter phase 
It is the norm in school science for activities to take place in a lively, interactive, and sometimes 
distracting environment. Conversely, the experimental conditions for the lone experimenter phase 
were devised in an attempt to recreate an environment that more resembles how a professional 
scientist might collect data, using care and accuracy of measurement free from distraction. There were 
no differences between the predictions or observations of the T-L and the H-D groups that were 
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statistically significant (pupils did not make conclusions during the lone experimenter phase). In 
addition, within each group there was no single material that was predicted or measured as being 
significantly warmer than the others. The T-L and H-D pupils did not differ with respect to any of the 
variables that were discussed previously with the whole class phase, therefore no expectancy effect 
was apparent when the two lone experimenter groups were compared (although see random error 
group results, discussed later). 
 The current study took the form of two randomised experiments, the whole class and lone 
experimenter phases. Within each of these phases, independent variables were kept constant apart 
from the independent variable under study, i.e. a theory-led approach. This enabled valid comparisons 
to be made within each phase, with any noted differences being likely to be related to the independent 
variable. However, since between phases comparisons are quasi-experimental in type, associations 
must be made more tentatively than those within phases, which were true randomised experiments. 
That said, data indicate that although the T-L pupils in the lone experimenter phase had performed a 
similar illustrative task to their whole class T-L counterparts, their results were not as influenced by 
their knowledge of a ‘right answer’. One might have expected the former pupils to have been more 
influenced than the latter. With all the lone experimenters what they had predicted to be the best 
material was confirmed as being correct by teacher before they collected data, so every personal 
preconception was reinforced by the textbook answer - instead, the opposite happened.   
 
c) Random error group 
Part of the lone experimenter sample (n=9) was used to determine how accurate pupils could be when 
using thermometers to measure the temperature of water in the absence of any preconceptions due to 
lagging materials (table 4). Because of the controlled conditions associated with having a single set of 
apparatus, the temperatures within each cup were known by the teacher during the lone experimenter 
phase, the random error group included (see table 4). Only one of the nine pupils in the random sample 
recorded the temperatures with complete accuracy (pupil # 99), which gives an indication of the 
difficulty pupils of this age group have with this particular skill. However, the pupils’ errors did not 
vary by more than 1ºC, apart from one pupil who registered an error of 1.5 ºC for a single cup. 
Interestingly, despite these errors, on average the readings obtained by the random group coincided 
precisely with the average real temperature, as monitored by the teacher throughout data collection 
(22.9ºC). 
 In contrast, while some of the pupils within the T-L and H-D groups of the lone experimenter 
phase read the thermometers with good accuracy, as a whole they recorded higher temperatures than 
the random group (means were T-L = 23.4ºC, H-D = 23.3ºC, with no significant differences between 
these two values). The presence of the lagging materials did not make measurement physically more 
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difficult, so it is likely that there was a degree of experimenter expectancy with both T-L and H-D 
pupils that culminated in them recording higher temperatures than was actually the case.  
In the whole class phase the T-L pupils recorded significantly higher temperatures than the H-
D pupils (19.1ºC and 18.5ºC respectively). This may have been an artefact, since the two lessons took 
place 30 minutes apart and ambient temperatures may have changed slightly; alternately, it might be a 
further indicator of experimenter expectancy in the T-L group. It was not possible to compare the 
random group with the whole class phase in this manner. This is because during the whole class phase 
each group worked in a different part of the room where local temperatures may have varied slightly. 
Also the researcher noted during trialling that when several thermometers were placed in the same cup 
of water that they had inherent inaccuracies and showed a range of different temperatures (which is 
typical of thermometers used in school science). These factors were not confounding since each whole 
class group used one thermometer, and their three cups were in the same part of the room so any local 
variations would not matter. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Résumé 
In a whole class environment, more pupils who experienced an illustrative lesson (T-L) appeared to be 
overly attached to theory when compared with pupils who underwent an enquiry lesson (H-D), with 
many in the former group failing to differentiate theory and evidence. This difference was not apparent 
when pupils carried out the same task in quiet, more solitary conditions where accuracy of 
measurement was encouraged free from distraction. This lack of differentiation manifested as the 
‘textbook right answer’ of fur as a superior heating material being recorded and concluded at 
frequencies greater than chance with the T-L whole class group. In addition, as well as confirming the 
teacher’s answer, 40% of the T-L pupils had also confirmed the rest of their predictions. Different 
pupils from this 40% had merged theory and evidence when they wrote conclusions that supported the 
right answer, even when their data refuted that theory.  
The current study provided few qualitative data with which to investigate the thinking behind 
pupils’ behaviours. However, the quantitative data give clues, as do the findings of other workers who 
have investigated similar behaviours, so providing an opportunity to make some tentative comments. 
In the remainder of this article contemplations are offered concerning the issue of likely pupil motives 
which help to explain the current research’s findings. 
 
Pedagogical effectiveness of the treatments 
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Can it be argued that the whole class T-L group were poor scientists? On one level they were 
replicating a procedure that would have been familiar to them, confirming a ‘textbook right answer’, 
so were not breaking any procedural rules. Pupils commonly encounter theory/evidence mismatches, 
and are generally told by the teacher to go with the textbook and put their ‘wrong’ results down to 
experimenter error (Claxton, 1986). However, the T-L group were reporting phenomena that should 
not have actually occurred. When pupils fail to collect the ‘right result’, they can fabricate a more 
appropriate substitute (e.g. Keiler & Woolnough, 2002); this is one possible explanation. They may 
have rejected any anomalous data by simply deciding their experiment was a failure, a justification 
which has been noted in other studies (author, 2011; Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Gunstone, Mitchell & the 
Monash Children's Science Group, 1988; Hesse, 1987). Alternately, either consciously or 
unconsciously, they could have manipulated apparatus or method to ensure the ‘right answer’ was 
gained (author, 2011). Possible strategies include warming cups with their hands, and dipping their 
fingers in the water to test the temperature (one pupil was seen to do this). During science lessons 
pupils sometimes undertake a ‘quick check’, where they say ‘ok we know what the answer will be but 
let’s do a check anyway (quickly glances at thermometer), ok that’s right, it’s just as we thought’ 
(author, 2006). These pupils are well aware of the ‘right answer’ that they should be collecting, and so 
experience a form of self denial where they suspect that their experiment might be wrong, and so data 
might refute their theory, and so a careful, longer check is deliberately avoided. On this level, the T-L 
whole class lesson was inferior pedagogically because it bred experimenter expectancy. 
It could equally be argued that the H-D lesson was pedagogically poor since it failed to refute 
the misconception that materials at ambient temperature can actively warm other ambient materials 
(first reported by Tiberghien, Sere, Barboux & Chomat, 1983). The random error group’s results (table 
4) confirmed that pupils find accurate measurement using glass thermometers very difficult, and errors 
of 1ºC either way are common. Thus, even when free from preconceptions and behaving procedurally 
correctly, pupils of this age group are unlikely to conclude a scientific answer from this activity based 
solely on empirical data. Although the activity was used in the current research precisely because of 
this reason so to enhance error and promote any experimenter expectancy that may have been 
triggered, this exercise in itself is unsuitable pedagogically because of its inherent inaccuracy. 
Increasing the resolution of measurements, for example by using a digital thermometer which is easier 
to read, would be an improvement. Pupils tend not to realise that data collection is inherently random 
and often does not produce a single definitive ‘right answer’; instead a spread of values are collected 
that approximate to that right answer (Lubben, Campbell, Buffler & Allie, 2001). This is why science 
curricula promote repeat measurements during experiments. In the current study ideally pupils who 
had successfully bracketed any preconceptions should have realised this randomness was the reason 
why they were not measuring exactly the same temperature in each of the three cups. 
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Overly data-laden experimenting 
If a professional scientist blindly accepted unreliable results they would be operating in an overly data-
laden manner, applying an inductive scientific method, and would be criticised since the data indicate 
faulty instrumentation or method. Thus, it could be argued that some pupils in the current study were 
similarly behaving robotically and did not recognise that their data were indeed inaccurate, so were 
excessively data-laden. Millar, Lubben, Gott and Duggan (1994) found that 10% of students in their 
study could not 'see' any patterns in quantitative data, and seemed to take measuring in school science 
as a kind of mindless ritual, with no clear purpose other than to obtain sets of numbers that actually 
mean nothing to them. In the current study, since 292 out of 297 reported temperatures were exact to 
the degree, many pupils were rounding up or down when recording their results, which is scientifically 
acceptable. But judgments about whether to round up or down were likely to be a source of error that 
contributed to the wide variety of different temperatures that were recorded. Importantly, because 
these data were ambiguous in the sense that a choice between two temperatures was possible, it 
allowed room for bias, either consciously or otherwise.  
 
Accuracy of measurement 
The mean temperature range of the random error group is lower than those of the other groups (table 
6). The greater spread of temperatures collected by the other groups indicates that factors were at play 
that made different pupils who underwent the same treatment record values that varied more from the 
real temperature (although with the whole class phase, for reasons discussed above, it could not 
assumed that there was a single real temperature). It is proposed that these factors were related to 
experimenter expectancy. In this sense, the random error group were the best scientists in the sample 
since they observed with the greatest accuracy. This was due to a complete absence of experimenter 
expectancy since they had to measure the temperatures of three identical, unlagged cups, and ideally 
the other pupils should have displayed these same levels of accuracy by bracketing any theory-led 
expectations and being absolutely objective.  
Conditions for the lone experimenters attempted to provide a distraction-free environment for 
pupils so that accuracy of measurement could be maximised. Since these conditions differed in a 
number of ways from the whole class, which one or combination of them was specifically causative 
for the less theory-led behaviour of the lone experimenter pupils? A pupil’s temperature range is 
assumed to be a measure of accuracy, since accurate measurement would involve collecting three 
equal values (at the ‘real’ temperature). When the temperature ranges of each phase were compared it 
was found that pupils in the lone experimenter phase had not displayed more accuracy then whole 
class pupils. Thus, it seems that factors inherent within the lone experimenter conditions that were 
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designed to improved accuracy of measurement (distraction-free, practice with flashcards, one 
thermometer per cup) in fact did not impact on accuracy. The random error pupils apart, since all 
groups had operated at equivalent levels of accuracy this suggests that the absence of peers and/or the 
close presence of the teacher were governing factors when the lone experimenter T-L pupils 
successfully differentiated their theory and evidence. 
 
Overly theory-laden mind set 
During data collection, 40% of the whole class T-L group not only reproduced the teacher’s right 
answer of fur being the warmest material (as they had also predicted), they also reproduced the rest of 
their predictions in entirety. The requirement to produce one given result during experimentation 
appeared to generate a theory-led mindset in these pupils where theory and evidence merged 
completely. This infers that the problems associated with illustrative practicals may be more extensive 
than previously demonstrated by other studies, as within a notable proportion of whole class T-L 
pupils theory-ladeness proliferated to a level beyond that planned by the teacher. Of course, one 
limitation of the current study is its comparatively small scale, therefore generalisations such as this 
(based on 8/19 pupils), despite being based on significant statistics, must remain tentative until larger 
numbers of pupils are surveyed.  
 
Encouraging the acceptance of anomalies 
A different problem would be if pupils came to a class with strongly held misconceptions then they 
would need convincing evidence in order for them to reconstruct an alternative that aligns with 
accepted science (e.g. author, 2010). Even if they are told the ‘right answer’, and the experimental 
phenomenon reliably demonstrates this, any tendency to not differentiate between their own theory 
(the misconception) and evidence would mean continued existence of that misconception.  
A further problem is when the empirical evidence is correct but the textbook theory has been 
incorrectly applied, e.g. there is some aspect of the system under study that differs from the textbook, 
as was the case with the T-L treatments in current study. In this case pupils would need to recognise 
that their results are fine, and then reject that theory, as did the T-L lone experimenters. Illustrative 
school science sometimes fails to confirm theory because the experiment goes wrong and produces 
anomalous data. If pupils see anomalies they should be vocal and bring the teacher’s attention to them, 
not blindly discard them and go with the textbook - we do not want them to always fall back on the 
textbook if there is convincing evidence that says otherwise. If we want pupils to think like scientists, 
they need to be able to fairly weigh theory and evidence against each other in this way.  
 
The pedagogical usefulness of being overly theory-led 
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Because the T-L activity in a whole class context generated notable experimenter expectancy, it could 
be used on its own as a pedagogical tool to teach one aspect of the nature of science. Pupils could 
carry out the activity and at the end the teacher demonstrates that the temperatures in all three cups are 
actually equal. This could then be related to the fact that historically, professional scientists have been 
known to be overly theory-led which has ensued in the collection of biased data that fulfils a self-
fulfilling prophesy. This can be at the least, embarrassing for the scientist, and at worst career-ending, 
so pupils must themselves take note of their empirical data, only rejecting them with good cause and 
not glibly explaining them away as experimenter error. Alternately, half the class could be told the 
‘right answer’ (T-L) and the other half not told (H-D), then both groups come together at the end for 
discussion (Millar, 1989). 
 
 
Implications 
 
Some workers have proposed that school pupils can have a natural tendency to prefer theory over 
evidence, failing to differentiate between the two entities (Zimmerman, 2007). This tendency could be 
only exacerbated during illustrative lessons, where theory and evidence must correlate. If activities are 
commonly presented as illustrative exercises then it is possible that procedurally improper behaviours 
may become part of pupils’ repertoires, re-emerging later when they become undergraduates 
(Birkhead, 2007) or professional scientists (Dunbar, 2000). Although it would be impossible to 
dispose of the illustrative approach as a way of teaching science concepts (Nott & Smith, 1995), it is 
recommended that wherever possible, teachers minimise any experimenter effect by presenting 
practical work as  hypothetico-deductive enquiry exercises where the ‘right answer’ is initially not 
made obvious to pupils. However, there are well recognised problems with effectively encouraging 
teachers to deliver enquiry lessons without adequate professional training and support, for instance due 
to the perceived preparation time required (Blanchard et al., 2010). 
 Data from the current research suggest that an illustrative practical generated less theory-led 
behaviour when experimenters were allowed to work in private, away from peers, where careful 
measurement was encouraged in a distraction free environment. From the 1960s-1980s both in the US 
and the UK, informed by behaviourist theory, modern foreign language teaching in many schools 
assumed that pupils learn best when carrying out repetitive behaviours in isolated cubicles away from 
distractions (Roby, 1996). Although language labs have now fallen out of favour, there may be worth 
in the idea of encouraging science pupils to work more independently, making careful observations 
with a minimum of disturbance, and then come together with peers at the end in order to compare 
conclusions. This would be more ‘authentic’ of professional science, and offer valuable reflective 
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time. All this said, there was evidence in the current study of some experimenter expectancy when 
pupils worked in solitary conditions, regardless of the application of the illustrative or the enquiry 
approach.  
Traditionally, pupils work in collaborative groups when they collect data during science 
lessons (Watson et al., 2004). Advantages include peer support for less confident pupils (Gott & 
Duggan, 1995), opportunities to discuss data interpretation, the fact that children enjoy doing practical 
work with their friends, and also pragmatic reasons such as a lack of apparatus that exempts solo 
experimenting. Some writers have highlighted disadvantages of group work. Dominant members take 
over operations, leaving others redundant (Simon & Jones, 1992). The acquisition of science concepts 
and process skills are individualistic pursuits, and these are often neglected when working with peers, 
where the most important thing becomes producing a good joint report (Watson et al., 2004).  
 In Information Technology or Design and Technology lessons, pupils tend to work as 
individuals on their own projects though still have access to peer and teacher support when needed. 
Similarly, in high school and undergraduate science, practical work tends to become more 
individualistic with students having their own sets of apparatus to operate. Future work could 
investigate the viability of such strategies in the earlier years of school science. Curricula attempt to 
encourage authentic scientific behaviour in pupils. Perhaps the time has come to look again at how real 
scientists work, and how best this can be reflected in schools to promote experimentation that is 
neither overly theory nor data-laden.  
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i
 This is sometimes referred to in the literature as the observer expectancy effect. 
ii
 Trialling using both glass thermometers and datalogger temperature probes had shown that water in the three cups 
remained at the equivalent temperatures over long periods. 
iii
 The water used in the experiment was at ambient temperature.  However, if one were to dip one’s fingers into this water 
it would feel colder than the surrounding air because heat is transferred away from the fingers more quickly. In wintertime, 
the sea may be at a higher temperature than the surrounding air but a person would lose body heat far more rapidly if they 
fell into the sea, compared to being on dry land, due to this enhanced heat transfer effect. 
iv
 When numerical counts are cited they are exclusive of uncodeable responses. 
v
 Note that all claims in the subsequent sections of this article are based on statistically significant associations, unless 
otherwise stated. 
